European Studies

MA. European Politics                                                                         

Unit. Eastern Europe: Societies in transition  

topic:

To what extent did Gorbachev’s policies contribute to the collapse of the communist governments in Eastern Europe? 

By: Khinh Sony Lee Ngo
Faculty of Social Science, South Bank University, London, , April 2002         

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Key words: Communism, Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika                    .

Contents:
1. Introduction to Gorbachev’s policy
2. External and Internal Situation
3. Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika
4. Conclusion
References
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1. Introduction to Gorbachev’s policy

When one asked: To what extent did Gorbachev’s policies contribute to the collapse of the communist governments in Eastern Europe?, many people, especially those in the academic community would come up with a prompt answer: glasnost and perestroika. Many of those asked in the capitalist West would surely know who Gorbachev but would not know what the term glasnost and perestroika meant, nonetheless, they would know that they were crucial, central and vital in connection to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the USSR in 1991 after Gorbachev left government office. But glasnost and perestroika did not just happened – did Gorbachev really wanted to terminate communism? – No, certainly not, in fact Gorbachev was the real communist leader, who determine was to carry out and implementation his holistic ideal approach in order to rescue the situation. Thus, his goal was to bring the USSR into a new phase of development for advancing better living standards and encourages more freedom for citizens. Heading the Soviet Union into a new stage of change such as building up advanced efficient administration and, embark on a major modernization the political economy within Soviet structures apparatus. Gorbachev, as Tucker put it, “the reform leader…espouses the community’s sustaining myth, its professional ideal culture patterns and defines the deviation of certain practices from those patterns as a wrong situation that can and should be corrected by changing the practices” (Tucker, R. C. 1987, 26). Furthermore, according to Stephen White (a professor of Politics at the University of Glasgow), talking about Gorbachev, he observes that, Gorbachev and his reform had sought to replace Stalinist socialism with one that was “humane and democratic”, and that unlike Stalin, Gorbachev sought to create rooms for his citizens so that they can have the opportunity to “initiative”, as well as for “individual judgement on matters of philosophy or public policy from which came eventually to define as political pluralism” (White S. 2002, p.74). Gorbachev, and his hypothesis – glasnost and perestroika – his attempt to correct the circumstances political institution and economic situation disadvantage of the USSR by implementing his ideals from which were truly developing from his experiences and truly absorbing from his heart – by saying that I mean his pragmatic approach, his responses to the real world both inner and outer, his endeavours to changing the practices restructuring the political economy for the benefits of its citizens. Reformists prior to Gorbachev, were Khruschev – accordingly, who actually bring about a political ‘thaw’ and de-Stalinization programme – launched in 1956, and Andropov in the early 1980s – who introduced policies of “investment and anti-corruption measures” (Hudson, K. 2000, p.51.), and a campaign against alcoholism, but he died in February 1984 shorting after his reforms were carried out, nevertheless, according to Hudson, his reforms was achieved quite a significant decisive impact on the economy as a whole. The reactionaries were represents by Brezhnev and Kosygin (1964-1982) and, Chernenko (April 1984- March 1985). The most significant event of this struggle between reformers and reactionaries (prior to Gorbachev came to power in April 1985) was the removal of Khrushchev (Oct 1964) and his replacement by the reactionary Brezhenev and Kosygin. This led to what Gorbachev in his interpretation dubbed the era of stagnation. Of course, it was that in the late period of this era of crisis that had brought Russia descent into the list of countries of the third world, while the Soviet Union’s high post-war growth rates began to slum down since 1975. The trend thereafter was no hope but, gradually downward further and further. Thus based on these fundamentals turmoil of the past, Gorbachev in principle worked out and developing glasnost and perestroika to introduce as perception instrumental apparatus to reverse this trend.

 

2. External and Internal Situation

At that time, the West, led by America, was conducting a rapid and technologically sophisticated arms build up. From the Soviet viewpoint, the most worrying, was the threatened development of first generation space weapons – the ‘Strategic Defence Initiative or Stars Wars’. The Soviet Union already faced tremendous disadvantaged of no economic glorious inherent of the past in compare to the West, plus more than a decades of economic declines which had made the Soviet Union the scarcity of the financial resources to compete. Thus, the expenditures on the Soviet arms build-up had long exceeded the country’s capability to expend on them as the same time still maintain the population’s standard of living. The new strategy of the US with its Western allies initiative threatened to strain the Soviet economy to a situation of breaking point. Hence, the US and Western politics strategic efforts, after all, unleash the forces of the US hegemony, the outcome served as a result – a main key factor for the broken down of the Berlin wall. At this point, Hudson has observes: “The United State and its NATO allies devoted enormous resources to defeating the anti-missiles movement and they were ultimately successful although they did pay a price in term of the emergence of a new radical force in Western European politics. That victory for Ronald Reagan and his allies then set a scene for the events, which, were to culminate in 1989 (Hudson, K. 2000, p.29).

  

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe declining rates of growth and technological stagnation led to a substantial loss of confidence in their planning for the economy. The failure of its imbalanced in the industrial apparatus – as a result, driven the Soviet Bloc almost to a standstill. The East could not compete to catch up with the West was in supplying the consumer sector and services and in providing a variety of food stuffs, adequate housing and enormous many other material goods needed to raise the standards of living. In addition, there was a fear that “the Soviet Union could not sustain another spiral of the arms race ” (Hudson, K. 2000, p.46).

 

In the circumstances reflecting to both external and internal factors warrant between policy makers and intellectuals as to whether economic decentralisation and perhaps introduce market economy of Western style mode of system operation might solve the problem of the Soviet Bloc. Nonetheless, the general consensus seemed to be high on the political agenda that it should be carry out an economic reform in order to go further and catch up with the US and West.               

3.  Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika

On taking over in April 1985, Gorbachev priority policy was “to carry out a limited reform of the Soviet economy, though not introduce capitalism, and to gain the breathing space for this, by easing tensions with the West” (Hudson, K. 2000, p.46).

Four specific goals of Gorbachev policy as Hudson has pointed out were: “firstly, by reducing the Soviet intervention into various regional conflicts; secondly, by signalling that the Soviet Union would not intervene to back the communist regimes in Eastern Europe; thirdly, by acceding to German unification; and finally, by embarking upon the full-scale Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe (Hudson, K. 2000, p.46).

 

Gorbachev, as we have learned through our time in global history, a good human characters by nature and – a great leader with a golden-heart for peace. In the sense of diplomacy, Having already exhausted from the US and its Western allies, on their strategic behaviours for decades since they pursued the Cold War, forcing the Soviet Union onto the game, of nothing else but, the expending ever greater the natural resources, and human efforts, into its defence and military weapon programmes in order to match the US, as a use of economic based sacrifice thus not really economic competition. This hegemony of the US and Western allies for a larger extent, wasn’t very much favourable and, in fact, almost opposite to the thinking of Gorbachev, a leader born to make peace, not war. Therefore by take over the position as general secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party (CPSU), Gorbachev immediately sought for peace by reduced tension with the US and the West. In addition, Gorbachev also withdrawal Soviet troops from Afghanistan and, gave fully its freedom in decision making for the Eastern Bloc – which eventually, brought to their collapse in November 1989. Simply because, having rely on the Soviet Union both, politically and military in many decades – now suddenly, you are on your own – the communist regimes in Eastern Bloc, turned out to be hopeless due to lack of incapacity and inefficiency and thus, at the end, run out of controls when faced mass solidarity movements and democratic protests (as these events were happened in the past, but usually restored order by required helps from Russian military tanks interventions), hence, these circumstances serves, as destructive forces which eventually, ended on their communist parties monopolist powers. Three great factors which, contributed to the enormous solidarity movements and democratic protests were: – Firstly, in Eastern Europe, especially since the decline of economic growth in late 1960s and, its further deteriorate in the 1970s and 80s served as a result, falling the levels of living standards of Eastern Europe. This deterioration standard of living had serious negative impact on the population as a whole, as there are growing discontents to their own governments, as well as against to the Soviet model of development and control. They demand for political change, for democratic and market economy in which, to a very large extent, eventually brought these movements and protests. – Secondly, there had been decades, media transmissions and television signals from Western Europe, had shown to the population of Eastern Bloc the luxury material attraction images of lives and goods of the capitalist West – thus this sort of media invasions, has effectively impact on the people of the East – they made them keen to think Westward and, discouraged them be at peace with build their own societies (the Marxist one). Instead, they effect on growing ever more discontent with their governments and, hence, this sort of media diplomacy of the capitalist West, to a large extent, had affected quite a numbers in the population, were in many years had not really been fully repudiated the Eastern Bloc planned economy. – Finally, Gorbachev’s policy has opened a new period of change in Eastern Europe. As since perestroika and glasnost were been introduced. It has the effect soften the policy of Eastern Bloc, so that in these periods during reforms, many of the population in Eastern Bloc, had the chanced sought road westward. Thus then, their sentiment of discontent encouraged their desire of movements, to demand for democratic style of governments, became more realistic. In which, followed the victory of Polish Solidarity in June 1989 and, eventually, brought the later forming of multiple parties throughout Eastern Bloc. – Thus, with the great supports from Gorbachev for the notion of unification of Germany and, eventually withdrawal of the Russian troops, served as a result – dismantling the Berlin wall on 9th November 1989 – Needless to say, Gorbachev’s new politics, were the major causes of the revolution and hence the collapsed of communist governments in Eastern Europe.

 

At home in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was launching his economic policy, perestroika and glasnost.

His attempt to increase economic efficiency, (perestroika) that is to ‘restructuring’ the political economy, eliminate corruption and catch up with the technological development of the West. In pursuing to backing up economic performance, one of Gorbachev policy instruments was, allow public access to information resources and to some extent, free discussion in the name of ‘openness’ (glasnost). However, according to James Joll (a Professor of International History at London School of Economic and Emeritus Professor of the University of London) has pointed out that, the embark on the task of Gorbachev’s policy – “these moves seem to have provoked considerable opposition from the more conservative and deeply entrenched members of the Communist Party, and by the end of 1988 it was still uncertain how far Gorbachev’s internal reforms would be successful and their impetus maintained. The prospect of reform encouraged the expression of nationalist feeling throughout the Soviet Union, and particularly in Armenia and the Baltic republics, so that the internal situation seemed more fluid than for many years” (Joll James, 1990, p.490). Thus, the fluidity of nationalist movements as Joll described and, their momentum growing effects, is later largely seen that precipitate the break-up of the USSR into sovereign states.     

    

Gorbachev, his ambition was the need to restructure the economic mechanism, as David Lane describes “the thinking of leadership under Gorbachev involved a movement away from administrative methods of control of the economy to greater reliance on the market, prices and competition”. However, David Lane further argues that the contradiction of Gorbachev’s policy was with which, a new layer of policy putting on top of the old based system apparatus (which been rooted by previous leadership) is unsuitable and conflicted, and that this duality was a key factor for the collapse of the USSR, thus according to David Lane: “In the period between 1986 and 1989, the reform policy of perestroika was born. It was a venture to reconstruct the communist system as it had developed from the time of Stalin and to achieve a major recasting of the organizing principles, though not the fundamental institutions, of Soviet society. This duality between principles and institutions, with its implicit contradictions, was to prove the downfall of the last serious attempt to reconstruct the Marxist Leninist state” (Lane, D. 1996, p.102). Nevertheless, Lane went further to compare and concluded that: Perestroika is the term used to describe the process of change. It may be translated by ‘restructuring’, or ‘radical reform’; with the passage of time it came to mean revolutionary transition. The significance of perestroika is that it is a comprehensive policy of change. While reforms had occurred under Khrushchev, Kosygin and Brezhnev, they were piecemeal rather than systemic; they assumed that the underlying structures were essentially sound and ensured fundamental social and political harmony – they needed improvement rather than radical reform. Underlying the process of perestroika was a major theoretical reappraisal of social relation in the USSR  (Lane, D. 1996, p.102-3).

 

Paradoxically, at Hudson observes: “Gorbachev was elected with the expectation that he would modernise the economy, probably along the same line that Andropov has commenced in the earlier 1980s, (as mentioned in the introduction part of this essay, were of investment and anti-corruption measures amongst other aspects). But, although commencing the 12th Five-year Plan in 1985 with just such policies, by 1988 it became apparent that Gorbachev’s reforms were unleashing forces that were going to lead to fundamental change if they were not restrained (Hudson, K. 2000, p.51).

Certainly, as agreed to amongst other commentators represents in this essay, I go further with Hudson’s views – Yet that Gorbachev was a reformer in the shape and pattern of Andropov because, Andropov was obviously has shown an alert cautious hypothesis of reform. His aims were to correct corruption in the bureaucracy and, improve the industrial efficiency by trying the task of shifting away the heavy industry. In addition, Andropov policy was particularly by dealing with the problem of high levels of alcoholism found in the work place. Andropov’s efforts were to decentralise economic decisions making and increase the autonomy of enterprise managers, hence, aims to boosting the economy. Unfortunately, his short lived as a reform leader not allowed him to pursue his goals. Gorbachev adopted Andropov’s policy and developing into a set of more comprehensive fashion which, was sound extremely dynamic and scent of prosperity, however, what he met was an extremely dogged adamant bureaucracy, deeply entrenched in their position within the Soviet system and their influence in the political culture – as they bull-headed unyielding refused to alter their behaviour.    

 

4. Conclusion

Was it then, the economic dimension that ultimately ended the seventy years bravely of communism since the glorious success of the Bolshevik revolution October 1917? The answer is – Certainly, there was not only but, a ‘principal factor’ amongst others. Needless to say, it was this factor that was actually substantial related to its collapse, no doubt. Since the economic slum in the late 1975 as the outcome of its imbalanced and biased to heavy industry in the industrial system apparatus – thus then, its further deteriorating associated with, the immense heavily bureaucracy and stubbornly networks of the existence state’s one party system, had decades however, in mechanism apparatus, had seeded a serious systemic disease (i.e. dogged adamant bureaucracy networks and their dangerous behaviours of influence in order to protecting their powers) in which, generated a volcano of problems which eventually, emotional erupted as a result of glasnost and perestroika. Hence, Although the economy’s increasing declining performance was the main stimulus for reform, its eventual broken down and collapse was a consequence of the dogged adamant heavily bureaucratic unanticipated political destabilization of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that had been brought about by reform – only in this sense did the Soviet planned economy play a role in the collapse of the USSR and obsolete the communist powers. It was not overthrown, it was all of sudden and unexpectedly. Thus, the fall of the Berlin wall 1989 following its collapsed of Eastern Europe communist regimes and, the fully demise of the USSR 1991, when Gorbachev eventually, resigned and left the historic of roundtable are results of factors combination and, enormously complexes: – external forces – internal economic crisis – the deeply rooted of its industrial imbalanced structure apparatus – systemic volcano of problems mechanism – surrounding immense adamant heavily bureaucracy networks. Do I need to say more?

 

 

 REFERENCES

 Hudson, Kate (2000), European Communism Since 1989, London, Macmillan, p.35.

James J. (1990). Europe Since 1870: An International History, Penguin, Fourth edition, p.490.   

Lane, D. (1996), The Rise and Fall of State Socialism, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK. p.1.

Tucker, R. C. (1987), Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev, p.26.

White S. (2002), Making of the Contemporary World: Communism and its Collapse, Routledge, p.74


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