1.
Introduction to Gorbachev’s policy
When
one asked: To what extent did Gorbachev’s policies contribute to the
collapse of the communist governments in Eastern Europe?, many people,
especially those in the academic community would come up with a prompt
answer: glasnost and perestroika. Many of those asked in the capitalist
West would surely know who Gorbachev but would not know what the term glasnost
and perestroika meant,
nonetheless, they would know that they were crucial, central and vital
in connection to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and
the demise of the USSR in 1991 after Gorbachev left government office.
But glasnost and perestroika did not just happened – did Gorbachev
really wanted to terminate communism? – No, certainly not, in fact
Gorbachev was the real communist leader, who determine was to carry out
and implementation his holistic ideal approach in order to rescue the
situation. Thus, his goal was to bring the USSR into a new phase of
development for advancing better living standards and encourages more
freedom for citizens. Heading the Soviet Union into a new stage of
change such as building up advanced efficient administration and, embark
on a major modernization the political economy within Soviet structures
apparatus. Gorbachev, as Tucker put it, “the reform leader…espouses
the community’s sustaining myth, its professional ideal culture
patterns and defines the deviation of certain practices from those
patterns as a wrong situation that can and should be corrected by
changing the practices” (Tucker, R. C. 1987, 26). Furthermore,
according to Stephen White (a professor of Politics at the University of
Glasgow), talking about Gorbachev, he observes that, Gorbachev and his
reform had sought to replace Stalinist socialism with one that was
“humane and democratic”, and that unlike Stalin, Gorbachev sought to
create rooms for his citizens so that they can have the opportunity to
“initiative”, as well as for “individual judgement on matters of
philosophy or public policy from which came eventually to define as
political pluralism” (White S. 2002, p.74). Gorbachev, and his
hypothesis – glasnost and perestroika – his attempt to correct the
circumstances political institution and economic situation disadvantage
of the USSR by implementing his ideals from which were truly developing
from his experiences and truly absorbing from his heart – by saying
that I mean his pragmatic approach, his responses to the real world both
inner and outer, his endeavours to changing the practices restructuring
the political economy for the benefits of its citizens. Reformists prior
to Gorbachev, were Khruschev – accordingly, who actually bring about a
political ‘thaw’ and de-Stalinization programme – launched in
1956, and Andropov in the early 1980s – who introduced policies of
“investment and anti-corruption measures” (Hudson, K. 2000, p.51.),
and a campaign against alcoholism, but he died in February 1984 shorting
after his reforms were carried out, nevertheless, according to Hudson,
his reforms was achieved quite a significant decisive impact on the
economy as a whole. The reactionaries were represents by Brezhnev and
Kosygin (1964-1982) and, Chernenko (April 1984- March 1985). The most
significant event of this struggle between reformers and reactionaries
(prior to Gorbachev came to power in April 1985) was the removal of
Khrushchev (Oct 1964) and his replacement by the reactionary Brezhenev
and Kosygin. This led to what Gorbachev in his interpretation dubbed the
era of stagnation. Of course, it was that in the late period of this era
of crisis that had brought Russia descent into the list of countries of
the third world, while the Soviet Union’s high post-war growth rates
began to slum down since 1975. The trend thereafter was no hope but,
gradually downward further and further. Thus based on these fundamentals
turmoil of the past, Gorbachev in principle worked out and developing
glasnost and perestroika to introduce as perception instrumental
apparatus to reverse this trend.
2.
External and Internal Situation
At
that time, the West, led by America, was conducting a rapid and
technologically sophisticated arms build up. From the Soviet viewpoint,
the most worrying, was the threatened development of first generation
space weapons – the ‘Strategic Defence Initiative or Stars Wars’.
The Soviet Union already faced tremendous disadvantaged of no economic
glorious inherent of the past in compare to the West, plus more than a
decades of economic declines which had made the Soviet Union the
scarcity of the financial resources to compete. Thus, the expenditures
on the Soviet arms build-up had long exceeded the country’s capability
to expend on them as the same time still maintain the population’s
standard of living. The new strategy of the US with its Western allies
initiative threatened to strain the Soviet economy to a situation of
breaking point. Hence, the US and Western politics strategic efforts,
after all, unleash the forces of the US hegemony, the outcome served as
a result – a main key factor for the broken down of the Berlin wall.
At this point, Hudson has observes: “The United State and its NATO
allies devoted enormous resources to defeating the anti-missiles
movement and they were ultimately successful although they did pay a
price in term of the emergence of a new radical force in Western
European politics. That victory for Ronald Reagan and his allies then
set a scene for the events, which, were to culminate in 1989 (Hudson, K.
2000, p.29).
In the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe declining rates of growth and technological
stagnation led to a substantial loss of confidence in their planning for
the economy. The failure of its imbalanced in the industrial apparatus
– as a result, driven the Soviet Bloc almost to a standstill. The East
could not compete to catch up with the West was in supplying the
consumer sector and services and in providing a variety of food stuffs,
adequate housing and enormous many other material goods needed to raise
the standards of living. In addition, there was a fear that “the
Soviet Union could not sustain another spiral of the arms race ”
(Hudson, K. 2000, p.46).
In
the circumstances reflecting to both external and internal factors
warrant between policy makers and intellectuals as to whether economic
decentralisation and perhaps introduce market economy of Western style
mode of system operation might solve the problem of the Soviet Bloc.
Nonetheless, the general consensus seemed to be high on the political
agenda that it should be carry out an economic reform in order to go
further and catch up with the US and West.
3.
Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika
On
taking over in April 1985, Gorbachev priority policy was “to carry out
a limited reform of the Soviet economy, though not introduce capitalism,
and to gain the breathing space for this, by easing tensions with the
West” (Hudson, K. 2000, p.46).
Four
specific goals of Gorbachev policy as Hudson has pointed out were:
“firstly, by reducing the Soviet intervention into various regional
conflicts; secondly, by signalling that the Soviet Union would not
intervene to back the communist regimes in Eastern Europe; thirdly, by
acceding to German unification; and finally, by embarking upon the
full-scale Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe (Hudson, K. 2000,
p.46).
Gorbachev,
as we have learned through our time in global history, a good human
characters by nature and – a great leader with a golden-heart for
peace. In the sense of diplomacy, Having already exhausted from the US
and its Western allies, on their strategic behaviours for decades since
they pursued the Cold War, forcing the Soviet Union onto the game, of
nothing else but, the expending ever greater the natural resources, and
human efforts, into its defence and military weapon programmes in order
to match the US, as a use of economic based sacrifice thus not really
economic competition. This hegemony of the US and Western allies for a
larger extent, wasn’t very much favourable and, in fact, almost
opposite to the thinking of Gorbachev, a leader born to make peace, not
war. Therefore by take over the position as general secretary of the
Soviet Union Communist Party (CPSU), Gorbachev immediately sought for
peace by reduced tension with the US and the West. In addition,
Gorbachev also withdrawal Soviet troops from Afghanistan and, gave fully
its freedom in decision making for the Eastern Bloc – which
eventually, brought to their collapse in November 1989. Simply because,
having rely on the Soviet Union both, politically and military in many
decades – now suddenly, you are on your own – the communist regimes
in Eastern Bloc, turned out to be hopeless due to lack of incapacity and
inefficiency and thus, at the end, run out of controls when faced mass
solidarity movements and democratic protests (as these events were
happened in the past, but usually restored order by required helps from
Russian military tanks interventions), hence, these circumstances
serves, as destructive forces which eventually, ended on their communist
parties monopolist powers. Three great factors which, contributed to the
enormous solidarity movements and democratic protests were: – Firstly,
in Eastern Europe, especially since the decline of economic growth in
late 1960s and, its further deteriorate in the 1970s and 80s served as a
result, falling the levels of living standards of Eastern Europe. This
deterioration standard of living had serious negative impact on the
population as a whole, as there are growing discontents to their own
governments, as well as against to the Soviet model of development and
control. They demand for political change, for democratic and market
economy in which, to a very large extent, eventually brought these
movements and protests. – Secondly, there had been decades, media
transmissions and television signals from Western Europe, had shown to
the population of Eastern Bloc the luxury material attraction images of
lives and goods of the capitalist West – thus this sort of media
invasions, has effectively impact on the people of the East – they
made them keen to think Westward and, discouraged them be at peace with
build their own societies (the Marxist one). Instead, they effect on
growing ever more discontent with their governments and, hence, this
sort of media diplomacy of the capitalist West, to a large extent, had
affected quite a numbers in the population, were in many years had not
really been fully repudiated the Eastern Bloc planned economy. –
Finally, Gorbachev’s policy has opened a new period of change in
Eastern Europe. As since perestroika and glasnost were been introduced.
It has the effect soften the policy of Eastern Bloc, so that in these
periods during reforms, many of the population in Eastern Bloc, had the
chanced sought road westward. Thus then, their sentiment of discontent
encouraged their desire of movements, to demand for democratic style of
governments, became more realistic. In which, followed the victory of
Polish Solidarity in June 1989 and, eventually, brought the later
forming of multiple parties throughout Eastern Bloc. – Thus, with the
great supports from Gorbachev for the notion of unification of Germany
and, eventually withdrawal of the Russian troops, served as a result –
dismantling the Berlin wall on 9th November 1989 – Needless to say,
Gorbachev’s new politics, were the major causes of the revolution and
hence the collapsed of communist governments in Eastern Europe.
At
home in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was launching his economic policy, perestroika and glasnost.
His
attempt to increase economic efficiency, (perestroika)
that is to ‘restructuring’ the political economy, eliminate
corruption and catch up with the technological development of the West.
In pursuing to backing up economic performance, one of Gorbachev policy
instruments was, allow public access to information resources and to
some extent, free discussion in the name of ‘openness’ (glasnost).
However, according to James Joll (a Professor of International History
at London School of Economic and Emeritus Professor of the University of
London) has pointed out that, the embark on the task of Gorbachev’s
policy – “these moves seem to have provoked considerable opposition
from the more conservative and deeply entrenched members of the
Communist Party, and by the end of 1988 it was still uncertain how far
Gorbachev’s internal reforms would be successful and their impetus
maintained. The prospect of reform encouraged the expression of
nationalist feeling throughout the Soviet Union, and particularly in
Armenia and the Baltic republics, so that the internal situation seemed
more fluid than for many years” (Joll James, 1990, p.490). Thus, the
fluidity of nationalist movements as Joll described and, their momentum
growing effects, is later largely seen that precipitate the break-up of
the USSR into sovereign states.
Gorbachev,
his ambition was the need to restructure the economic mechanism, as
David Lane describes “the thinking of leadership under Gorbachev
involved a movement away from administrative methods of control of the
economy to greater reliance on the market, prices and competition”.
However, David Lane further argues that the contradiction of
Gorbachev’s policy was with which, a new layer of policy putting on
top of the old based system apparatus (which been rooted by previous
leadership) is unsuitable and conflicted, and that this duality was a
key factor for the collapse of the USSR, thus according to David Lane:
“In the period between 1986 and 1989, the reform policy of perestroika
was born. It was a venture to reconstruct the communist system as it had
developed from the time of Stalin and to achieve a major recasting of
the organizing principles, though not the fundamental institutions, of
Soviet society. This duality between principles and institutions, with
its implicit contradictions, was to prove the downfall of the last
serious attempt to reconstruct the Marxist Leninist state” (Lane, D.
1996, p.102). Nevertheless, Lane went further to compare and concluded
that: Perestroika is the term
used to describe the process of change. It may be translated by
‘restructuring’, or ‘radical reform’; with the passage of time
it came to mean revolutionary transition. The significance of
perestroika is that it is a comprehensive policy of change. While
reforms had occurred under Khrushchev, Kosygin and Brezhnev, they were
piecemeal rather than systemic; they assumed that the underlying
structures were essentially sound and ensured fundamental social and
political harmony – they needed improvement rather than radical
reform. Underlying the process of perestroika was a major theoretical
reappraisal of social relation in the USSR
(Lane, D. 1996, p.102-3).
Paradoxically,
at Hudson observes: “Gorbachev was elected with the expectation that
he would modernise the economy, probably along the same line that
Andropov has commenced in the earlier 1980s, (as mentioned in the
introduction part of this essay, were of investment and anti-corruption
measures amongst other aspects). But, although commencing the 12th
Five-year Plan in 1985 with just such policies, by 1988 it became
apparent that Gorbachev’s reforms were unleashing forces that were
going to lead to fundamental change if they were not restrained (Hudson,
K. 2000, p.51).
Certainly,
as agreed to amongst other commentators represents in this essay, I go
further with Hudson’s views – Yet that Gorbachev was a reformer in
the shape and pattern of Andropov because, Andropov was obviously has
shown an alert cautious hypothesis of reform. His aims were to correct
corruption in the bureaucracy and, improve the industrial efficiency by
trying the task of shifting away the heavy industry. In addition,
Andropov policy was particularly by dealing with the problem of high
levels of alcoholism found in the work place. Andropov’s efforts were
to decentralise economic decisions making and increase the autonomy of
enterprise managers, hence, aims to boosting the economy. Unfortunately,
his short lived as a reform leader not allowed him to pursue his goals.
Gorbachev adopted Andropov’s policy and developing into a set of more
comprehensive fashion which, was sound extremely dynamic and scent of
prosperity, however, what he met was an extremely dogged adamant
bureaucracy, deeply entrenched in their position within the Soviet
system and their influence in the political culture – as they
bull-headed unyielding refused to alter their behaviour.
4.
Conclusion
Was
it then, the economic dimension that ultimately ended the seventy years
bravely of communism since the glorious success of the Bolshevik
revolution October 1917? The answer is – Certainly, there was not only
but, a ‘principal factor’ amongst others. Needless to say, it was
this factor that was actually substantial related to its collapse, no
doubt. Since the economic slum in the late 1975 as the outcome of its
imbalanced and biased to heavy industry in the industrial system
apparatus – thus then, its further deteriorating associated with, the
immense heavily bureaucracy and stubbornly networks of the existence
state’s one party system, had decades however, in mechanism apparatus,
had seeded a serious systemic disease (i.e. dogged adamant bureaucracy
networks and their dangerous behaviours of influence in order to
protecting their powers) in which, generated a volcano of problems which
eventually, emotional erupted as a result of glasnost and perestroika.
Hence, Although the economy’s increasing declining performance was the
main stimulus for reform, its eventual broken down and collapse was a
consequence of the dogged adamant heavily bureaucratic unanticipated
political destabilization of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that
had been brought about by reform – only in this sense did the Soviet
planned economy play a role in the collapse of the USSR and obsolete the
communist powers. It was not overthrown, it was all of sudden and
unexpectedly. Thus, the fall of the Berlin wall 1989 following its
collapsed of Eastern Europe communist regimes and, the fully demise of
the USSR 1991, when Gorbachev eventually, resigned and left the historic
of roundtable are results of factors combination and, enormously
complexes: – external forces – internal economic crisis – the
deeply rooted of its industrial imbalanced structure apparatus –
systemic volcano of problems mechanism – surrounding immense adamant
heavily bureaucracy networks. Do I need to say more?
REFERENCES
Hudson,
Kate (2000), European Communism Since 1989, London, Macmillan, p.35.
James
J. (1990). Europe Since 1870: An
International History, Penguin, Fourth edition, p.490.
Lane,
D. (1996), The Rise and Fall of
State Socialism, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK. p.1.
Tucker,
R. C. (1987), Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to
Gorbachev, p.26.
White
S. (2002), Making of the
Contemporary World: Communism and its Collapse, Routledge, p.74
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